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The link between psychoanalysis and writing is inextri~ 
cable, especially since psychoanalytic theory both explains 
and justifies itself through analogies with writing. Inparticu­
lar, I wish to examine two such analogies: the textual analogy 
of the psyche's content in Freud's Interpretation ofDreams and 
the writing machine analogy of the psyche's structure in 
Freud's Note on the 'Mystic Writing Pad'. The ramifications of 
using the written text as a paradigm to explain psychical 
behavior affects theories of how writing produces meaning, 
of how the psyche negotiates its own textual nature and how 
this textual basis of psychoanalysis effects the institutional 
nature of psychoanalytic practice. I wish to focus on the 
relation between writing and the interpretation of psychical 
phenomena at their joint intersection with history by looking 
at three readings of Freud by Derrida, de Certeau and 
Deleuze/Guattari. In brief, the following question will be 
considered: how does writing produce meaning and what 
does this historicizing function imply about the psyche in 
general? 
Even a cursory glance at Freud's dream interpretation 
reveals a unique approach. Freud both uses his own dreams 
as scientific material and refuses to refer to a fixed universal 
key of translation. It is the latter that allows Freud to provide 
an innovative explanation of the relation between the signi­
fier and the signified in dreams. As Derrida points out: 
The absence of an exhaustive and absolutely infallible 
code means that inpsychic writing which thus prefig­
ures the meaning of writing in general, the difference 
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between signifier and signified is never radical. 
(Derrida 210) 
Indeed, Freud further suggests that dreams completelyeman­
cipate the signifier from the signified. This results in the 
treatment of words as things in themselves to the extent that 
words and plays on words are almost solely responsible for 
conveying meaning. However this treatment of signifiers 
immediately poses a problem for translating dreams. If the 
signifiers in dreams manufacture their own significance, the 
very arbitrariness of this production resists the possibility of 
translation. This is because translation requires a permanent 
code enabling the 1/ substitution or transformation of signifiers 
while retaining the same signified, always present. despite the 
absence of any specific signifier" (Derrida 210). It is clear that 
object of contention is the presupposed presence of meaning 
itself. On a prima facie level, by postulating both latent and 
manifest contents Freud seems to follow the paradigm of 
translation: transforming the latent signifiers into manifest 
signifiers which better express the always present but buried 
meaning which persists through the substitution game. 
However, a closer look at Freud's project reveals something 
different. The meaning of dreams does not so much satisfy 
the checklist of metaphysical attributes of immutability ­
enduring presence, atemporality, unity - but is itself a pro­
duction and hence fundamentally historical. This interpreta­
tion of Freud, somewhat against his intentions but without 
betraying him, now needs to be validated. 
The motivation for postulating a two-tiered conception 
of meaning itself follows from Freud's conviction that mani­
fest meanings are generally deliberate distortions which 
dissimulate the wishes that the dreamers want to but are 
'uncomfortable with' fulfilling. Freud first explainS the psy­
chical basis for such dissimulation via an analogy with writ­
ers. Dream wishes are like books whose meaning needs to be 
distorted to circumvent political censorship. One notable 
feature of this analogy is that Freud distinguishes between 
oral andwritten pronouncements. Oral pronouncements are 
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repressed after they have been spoken and so exhibit silence 
rather than distortion whereas written pronouncements are 
suppressed beforehand if they intend to make it into print. 
Thus, the "stricter the [social] censorship, the more far­
reaching will be the disguise and the more ingenious the 
means employed for putting the reader on the scent of the 
true meaning" (Freud 224). With this analogy, Freudnot only 
abrogates individual/social distinctions byusing social phe­
nomena to explain matters of the individual psyche but he 
also privileges the written text over the phonetic one as the 
closest approximation of the human psyche. 
For Derrida, this is crucial. It evinces a radical departure 
from the logocentric nostalgia which privileges speech as 
unmediated (logos as both words and reason; particularly 
the Christian adaptation of logos for the original Word, 
unitingword and deed in completeness and self-sufficiency) 
over writing as a mediated and hence corrupted, 'after the 
fact' supplement to the original meaning. IfFreud conceives 
the psyche as a written text, then he already sees it as 
deferring the originally intended meaning. Moreover if 
repression precedes articulation, then all meaning andsubse­
quently all understanding of ourselves is always already a 
dissimulation and interpretation. It is always historical and 
never original. Freud himself further validates this view of 
the historicized unconscious by describing the self as initially 
fractured and fundamentally plural. Dream distortion, like 
all conscious thought, is the handiwork of two agencies 
whereby the IIdistressing dreams do in fact contain some­
thing which is distressing to the second agency, but some­
thing which at the same time fulfills a wish on the part of the 
first agency" (Freud 228). Thus, the basic epistemic unit of 
Freudian psychology, the individual, consists of two mutu­
ally conflicting agents instead of the unified Kantian indi­
vidual which is the basis of enlightenment views of con­
sciousness. Instead of Kant's transcendental subject (who is 
the fixed, unified organizer of his sensations) Freud empha­
sizes the irrational. the unseen, the involuntary controlling 
the voluntary. In short, everything outside the scientific 
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domain of reason. Not only does Freud render the passions 
as motive agents, he also considers language as the joint 
production of desire and force. Desire expresses itself textu­
ally to bypass self-censorship. Writing is born out of desire's 
repression and so too is always originally repressed. 
Derrida explains the significance of considering meaning 
as the differential between the two forces of desire and 
repression: 
There is no present text in general and there is not 
even a past present text, a text which is past as having 
been present. The textis not conceivable in an originary 
or modified form of presence. The unconscious text 
is already a weave ofpure traces, differences in which 
force and meaning are united -a text nowhere present, 
consisting of archives which are always already tran­
scriptions. Originaryprints. Everything begins with 
production. Always already: repositories of meaning 
which was never present, whose signified presence 
was always reconstituted by deferral. (Derrida 211) 
There is no present text because repression (the social censor) 
always defers and by deferral produces meaning. The 
'originary prints', then, are the product of two actions. Be­
cause meaI').ing is only articulated after repression, it is al­
ways already deferred (desire only achieves articulation 
through negotiation with the censor). Furthermore, the 
'uncorrupted', 'original' presence of desire is always recon­
stituted by this deferral; it is interpreted or produced and not 
uncovered in its unadulterated state. Freud has thus 
historicized Kant's transcendental subject. Since we are 
initially plural and self-alienated, we also possess an inner 
historicity. Our own existence and self-knowledge is not 
something freely articulated but through its original defor­
mation implies a production of meaning. 
Both the pervasiveness of this deferral as well as Freud's 
task of founding a discourse out of the nonverbal interaction 
of psychic forces is encapsulated in his treatment of rhetorical 
figures. Rhetorical figures in their capacity as constitutive 
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components of meaning are themselves events (hence his­
torical) by which deformation creates gaps between what is 
desired, the expression of this desire and its fulfillment. In 
one of Freud's dreams he realizes that "the wish to go to 
Rome had become in my dream -like a cloak and symbol for 
a number of other passionate wishes" (Freud 285). The 
manifest content is here explicitly identified with the appar­
ently concurrent rhetorical figures of symbol andveil. But for 
something to qualify as a symbol (as opposed to being a 
trivial and hence negligible statement) is to confront us with 
the history of its effects. Thus although the symbol confronts 
us, it also masks the process by which it gains its importance 
and why it is meaningful in the first place. 
According to de Certeau, this symbol/mask duality is"at 
the heart of Freudian discoveries - the return of the re­
pressed" (de Certeau 3). Indeed he states that this 'mecha­
nism': 
is linked to a certain conception of time and memory, 
according to which consciousness is both the decep­
tive mask and operative trace of events that organize 
the present. (de Certeau 3) 
Thus the symbol is both anarchive of the differences between 
memories forgotten and remembered (why it is meaningful 
in the first place) - this is the operative trace - and the violence 
done to meaning to ensure its permanence - this is the 
deceptive mask. If we define the symbol as a special kind of 
sign that has practically effaced its referent, we approach 
Freud'5 notion of condensation. For example, in the dream 
about Irma's injection, Freud interprets Irma as a condensed 
figure who stands for many people: his daughter, the patient 
who succumbed to poisoning, his wife, her friend. Irma has 
become the collective image for people who had been /I sacri­
ficed to the work of condensation" (Freud 406). On the one 
hand, the use of 'sacrifice' indicates a violence done to mean­
ing - a dissimulation. On the other hand, the condensation 
creates a proliferation of signifiers because such IImultiple 
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determination makes it easier for an element to force its way 
into the dream-content" (Freud 402). This, at least theoreti­
cally, implies an infinity of interpretations. Aninfinitywhich 
too has been sacrificed for the sake of intelligibility. In this 
sense, the intelligibility of the present, its ability to explain 
itself to itself "takes the place of the history lost to it"; both 
because its meaningfulness is itself derived from a dissimu­
lation of meaning (the violence done to meaning in order to 
communicate it) and because intelligibility itself is based on 
a system of exclusion (de Certeau 29b). Thus, not only is the 
present itself always reconstituted by deferral (the original 
violence which communicates meaning) but itself must colo­
nize and empty out the past in order to retain its clarity. 
The same implications hold for displacement, the other 
rhetorical figure Freud emphasizes. The 1/consequence of the 
displacement is that the dream-content no longer resembles 
the core of dream-thought and that the dream gives no more 
than a distortion of the dream-wish which exists in the 
unconscious" (Freud 417). Distortion is the type of manifes­
tation (dream-content) which is a disguise, a willful substi­
tute which nevertheless fulfills the dream-thought in its 
fictive, hence rhetorical sphere. However, if the psychic 
structure of desire and repression is universal, then all articu­
lation of desire will need to circumvent repressive censorship 
and so will always be removed from the desire it wishes to 
articulate. This vitiates the possibility of anyone approach­
ing a finalist interpretation of latent meaning. The two 
rhetorical figures of condensation and displacement are cru­
cial in interpreting the textual fabric of the psyche; both are 
figures that are not self-evident but require a reading. Con­
densation in its near equivocation with symbols implies a 
reading concomitant with the rhetoric of optics; its heraldic 
qualities require a fine-tuned gaze; whereas displacement 
implies a complex grammar of interpretation. 
This rhetoric of optics crucially demonstrates how Freud 
once again privileges the written over phonetic language, 
One way Freud emphasizes the written text is by comparing 
the dream-content with a pictographic script (Freud 381-2). 
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Words in their capacity as pictures canmeanmany contradic­
tory things at once. As Derrida points out, this is in contrast 
with phonetic writing which necessarily relies on linear 
execution, always moves"frompresenttopresentpoint" and 
so remains in IIprofound complicitywith logos (or the time of 
logic) which is dominated by the principle of noncontradic­
tion, the cornerstone of all metaphysics of presence" (Derrida 
217). Freud's allegiance to nonphoneticwriting, particularly 
emphasized in its resistance of all logical relations and linear 
unfoldings of narrative, is further exposed in the following 
paragraph: 
The different portions of this complicated structure 
stand, of course, in the most manifold logical rela­
tions to one another. They can represent foreground 
and background, digressions and illustrations, con­
ditions, chains of evidence and counter-arguments. 
When the whole mass of these dream-thoughts is 
brought under the pressure of the dream-work, and 
its elements are turned about, broken into fragments 
and jammed together - almost like pack-ice - the 
questionarises of whathappens to the logical connec­
tions which have hitherto formed its framework. 
What representation do dreams provide for 'if', 'be­
cause', 'just as', 'although', 'either-or', and all the 
other conjunctions without which we cannot under­
stand sentences or speeches? (Freud 422) 
Aside from the spatialization or optical representation 
associated with referring to dream-content as pack-ice and 
hence circumvention of this 'time of logic', we have here a 
most peculiar situation. The crux of the Freudian position is 
that the unconscious causes certain conscious behaviors. But 
here, Freud insists that the whole causal contribution of the 
unconscious to understanding our desires is not immanent 
within the dream-content. Instead our discursive under­
standing interprets the unconscious, this pack-ice, as caus­
ally efficacious. For example, whereas the dream-content is 
Jand', 'and', 'and' ad infinitum we substitute 'either', 'or', 
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'because' etc. In other words, every narrative history, even 
the personal biography of the analysand involves attributing 
a motivation and causallinks which are not immanent in the 
unconscious. For scientific purposes this has a two-fold 
significance: first it exposes how causal and logical connec­
tions used in constructing historical narrative are substitu­
tions, interpretations; in short, fictions and second implies 
that the unconscious can never be conceptualized in its 
original state because understanding it is always already an 
interpretation. So far, however, Freud has only elucidated 
various characteristics of the psyche's content by comparing 
dreams with texts and rhetorical figures. Now, I will turn to 
the Mystic Writing Pad to investigate another textual meta­
phor which, this time, will express the structure or how the 
psyche works. 
Freud begins his exposition by delineating the merits and 
limitations of two forms of writing: paper-pen and chalk­
slate. Although the advantage of paper-pen writing lies in its 
ability to maintain a 'permanent trace' the receptive capacity 
of the writing surface is finite, easily exhaustible and cannot 
lose whatever trace has been inscribed on it. The chalk-slate 
method, on the contrary, both has a I receptive capacity for an 
unlimited time" and can erase the memory traces which have 
become uninteresting and obsolete. It, however, suffers the 
reverse of the paper-pen method, namely its complete inabil­
ity to maintain a permanent trace (Freud 227b). But with the 
invention of the mystic writing pad, Freud finds an appara­
tus which has Ifan unlimited capacity for new perceptions 
and nevertheless lays down permanent - even though not 
unalterable - memory-traces of them" (Freud 228b). Freud 
describes the functioning of the pad: 
To make use of the Mystic Pad, one writes upon the 
celluloid portion of the covering-sheet which rests on 
the wax slab. For this purpose no pencil or chalk is 
necessary, since the writing does not depend on the 
material being deposited on the receptive surfac.e ...a 
pointed stilus scratches the surface, the depressIOns 
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upon which constitute the 'writing' ...If one wishes to 
destroy what has been written, all that is necessary is 
to raise the double covering-sheet from the wax slab 
by a light pulL.the close contact between the waxed 
paper and the wax slab at the places where it has been 
scratched (upon which the visibility of the writing 
depended) is thus brought to an end and does not 
recur when the two surfaces come together once 
more. (Freud 229b) 
This apparatus corresponds with remarkable precision to 
Freud's radically dualistic model of consciousness. The 
system Pcpt-Cs (analogous to the covering sheet) receives 
perceptions but in order for it to Hreact like a clean sheet to 
each new perception" it retains no permanent trace (Freud 
22Sb). Instead the retention of the permanent traces is a 
function of the mnemic systems which lies behind the per­
ceptual system (analogous to the wax slab) and receive the 
trace of inscription. Already two important aspects emerge; 
first the psychical system consists of two separate but inter­
related systems thus once again affirming an original plural­
ity in our psychical constitution and second this psychical 
dualism itself implies that the U depth of the Mystic Pad is 
simultaneously a depth without bottom, an infinite allusion 
and a perfectly superficial exteriority" (Derrida 227). Inother 
words, this contraption allows for both a potentially infinite 
depth of implied meaning and the endless accretion of trace 
in the'deep' but limitless unconscious which lies behind the 
perception. It is a potentially infinite writing of the present 
(one can write on the celluloid ad infinitum) while simulta­
neously avoiding foundationalist pretenses (each system 
functions separately but in tandem: there is no first innocence 
in consciousness; to be conscious is to be, from the beginning, 
plural). Another important implication is that the ability to 
lift the celluloid and erase the writing is just as integral as the 
permanent traces which remain on the wax slab. Indeed, it 
seems tha t the psychical structure (and analogously writing) 
is contingent both on the contact between the celluloid and 
wax slab and the lifting of this contact which erases percep­
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tion and cleanses the receptive surface to receive sensory data 
anew. Memory functions to retain the trace of all these 
present moments. Further, memory points to the differences 
in what we perceive. It retains the difference between what 
perceptions are written down, engraved as trace and what 
perceptions permeate our consciousness without notice. Thus, 
not only are perceptions themselves cathected in that the 
only perceptions to contact with the receptive surface are 
those which interest us, but, derivatively, memory only 
retains traces of those perceptions cathected in the first place. 
Because perception is already an inscription on the celluloid, 
it follows that the "perceived may be read only in the past, 
beneath perception and after it" (Derrida 224). What we are 
actually conscious of perceiving is the cathected perceptions 
inscribed on our receptive system. Thus, the 'perceived' is 
always initially delayed. This explains Derrida's claim that 
IJ memory or writing is the opening of that process of appear­
ance itself" (Derrida 224). Appearance itself is contingent on 
the writing and memory traces which by differentiating 
perceptions create the conditions for the appearance. 
Freud next continues his analogy by comparing the /I ac­
tual breaking of contact which o,ccurs when the writing stops 
in the Mystic Writing Pad" with the IJperiodic, non-excitabil­
ity of the perceptual system" (Freud 225b). Freud postulates 
that consciousness functions as a series of periodic, discon­
tinuous "cathectic innervations II as if the "unconscious 
stretches out feelers ... towards the external world and hastily 
withdraws them" (Freud 231b). This periodic discontinuity 
has several important ramifications. First, on the Freudian 
schema the essence of our consciousness does not lie outside 
of time such as the Cartesian cogito, Plato's forms or other 
classic, timeless specimens. Second, this implies a heteroge­
neous, discontinuous concept of time rather than the homo­
geneous time typical of historiographic writing. Time is not 
an empty, homogeneous volume through which we progress 
historically in a smooth continuum between the past and 
present. Rather consciousness itself is a discontinuous flick­
ering and so implies a different relation between the past and 
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present. The present is disconnected from the past and this 
vitiates any simple cause-effect relation between them. More­
over, the spatial metaphor implied in the writing pad anal­
ogy further complicates linear cause-effect relations by in­
scribing the past on top of the present. The previous present 
is erased by the new present so that each present is simulta­
neously discontinuous with the past andyet contingent on its 
very erasure. The present maintains its necessary virginity 
by complete expulsion of the past; with gross imperialism it 
constitutes itself out of the past's exile. Moreover, if the 
present is always constituted anew by the deliberate forget­
fulness of the past this demonstrates that memory is always 
originally repressed, that this repression is what allows con­
sciousness to function and that the radical discontinuity of 
the subject implies that it too is always reconstituted anew. 
Like pure perception, a pure subject"does not exist: we are 
written as we write, by the agency within us which always 
already keeps watch over perception" (Derrida 226). Thus, 
we write ourselves in order to be conscious but this is always 
both a deferring of the previous present and the erasure of 
ourselves. 
But Freud did not .conclude this. Instead, Freud retains 
the idea of a subject whose potentially radical discontinuity 
is precariously maintained by the intangible concept of an 
unconscious retaining these 'permanent traces'. This meta­
physics of presence constitutes Freud's greatest betrayal. As 
Derrida states: " An unerasable trace is not a trace, it is a full 
presence, an immobile and incorruptible substance, a son of 
God, a sign of parousia...that is not a mortal germ" (Derrida 
230). Freud neglects the fact that the script of dreams and the 
mystic pad are only representations and so are static, inferior 
analogies rather than the foundations of a science. So on the 
one hand, to use de Certeau's happy phrase, Freud radically 
"used the dream as a Trojan horse to historicize rhetoric and 
reintroduce it into the citadel of science" (de Certeau 23b). 
But on the other hand, he kills the metaphor, naturalizes the 
unconscious not as hypothetical construct but as fact and so 
builds his interpretations and practice on the burial ground 
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of catachresis. In other words, Freud performs mythology or 
the science of origins. !tis precisely Freud's desire to treat the 
unconscious as a first cause that has evinced complaints from 
critics. Deleuze/Guattari complain that Freud's need for a 
transcendental guarantee imposes the verb 'to be' on these 
conjunctions of 'and', 'and, 'and' which is the infinity of 
interpretation (Deleuze/Guattari 25). The 'to be' of con­
sciousness is complicitous with the metaphysics of presence 
which permeates Western philosophy; seeking beginnings 
and erecting foundations instead of nullifying them. !tis this 
complicity which ties the institutional model of Freudian 
thought to psychoanalytic practice as institution.1 
This curious Freudian junction involves the intersection 
between historicism and fiction. Once again writing history 
(individual or social) involves both exile and imperialism or 
" cannibalistic discourse" (de Certeau 29b). On the one hand, 
the writing process" establishes at the beginning of writinga 
separation or exile" (de Certeau 29b). Oedipus begins inter­
preting his origins when he realizes that he is exiled from 
them. The unknown past pervades his present with a feeling 
as uncanny as the hidden 'trace' of the past engraved on his 
ankles. Thus the interpretation of origins, this Oedipal 
discourse, is founded in absence. Discourse is separated 
from its referent just as the 'present' of consciousness is 
always constituted by the forgotten past it colonizes (the 
writing pad is always erased). On other hand, writing is a 
" cannibalistic discourse" which takes the place of the 'history 
lost to it" (de Certeau 29b). In other words, dreams are 
initially alienated from their meaning because they express 
desires mutated by their articulation, nevertheless they also 
retain the trace which calls out to us to interpret them. But 
when we interpret we also deform the meaning of this trace 
and so the historical narration is cannibalistic: explanation 
crossesout the origin inorder to speak about it. This is where 
the betrayal of psychoanalysis occurs. It substitutes the 
crossing out, the negation, the acknowledgment of the ab­
sence of origin (which is always originally deferred) for 
JI survival under reprieve" (Deleuze/ Guattari 125). The can­
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nibalistic discourse equates /I discourse and reality by impos­
ing its discourse as the law governing the real" (de Certeau 
32b). Thus, it legitimates its own interpretation - rhetorical, 
fictive, itself a vehicle of deferral - by making it 'scientific'. 
This is where de Certeau locates institutionalizing ges­
ture of psychoanalysis which differs from fiction precisely 
because it claims it "might do or become what it says of 
writing" (de Certeau 30b). So, if writing is the result of the 
negotiation of desire with the censor then to write this nego­
tiation is essentially to write and construct the unconscious. 
Because there is no palpable origin, there is no way to make 
the unconscious conscious without engaging in the original 
duplicity of writing. The meaningfulness of the unconscious 
is produced, not recouped. But although for both Freud and 
a poet such as Schiller there is a loss of knowledge the 
outcome is different: "Freud's theoretic production is permit­
ted by a loss of knowledge while for Schiller poetic creation 
is permitted by a disappearance of being" (de Certeau 30b). 
Once again the presence/ absence dichotomy resurfaces. For 
Freud the loss of knowledge (exile from origin) avoids the 
nihilism and profound antilogos of this complete loss of 
'being' through masking its own production. It creates a 
discourse that speaks for the referent 'being' which, by the 
sleighthand of the psychoanalytic institution's own credibil­
ity as curative, is resurrected from the netherworld of noth­
ingness. Freud produces 'being', naturalizes iUn the name of 
the psychoanalytic institution and then proceeds to inscribe 
this 'real' unconscious with a truly 'documentary' history. 
This nothingness is, in fact, the hinge that legitimates the 
authoritative position of the analyst. He intervenes in the 
name of this nothingness and then proceeds to stamp his 
historicizing of the unconscious with the mark of reali ty. The 
institution qualifies the slide from historicity to epistemic 
skepticism (or poetic nothingness) via the authority of his­
tory'as ithappened'. Historicism which refuses to recognize 
its fictiveness dissimula tes itself by the mask of official, grand 
history. 
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Thus, although Freud ventures into historicism, he re­
turns to historiography. But the textual analogies of the 
psyche, from the textual content of the psyche in the I nterpre­
tation of Dreams to the textual structure of the psyche in the 
Mystic Writing Pad have done their work. Freud may have 
betrayed his historicizing activities - historicizing rhetoric, 
demonstrating the original dissimulation of writing, exceed­
ing the phonetic discourse typical of metaphysics, 
temporalizing and spatializing writing and the unconscious 
- but they, in turn, also betray him. To use Oedipal imagery 
against Freud, the son, the offspring of his work in turn 
betrays the father. The putative authority of psychoanalysis 
is undone by the postulates it needs in order to exist. 
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NOTES 
1. "The state as a model for the book and for thought has 
a long history: logos, the philosopher-king, the transcen­
dence of the Idea, the interiority of the concept, the republic 
of minds, the court of reason, the functionaries of thought, 
man as legislator and as subject" (Deleuze/Guattari 24). 
